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Abstract. I compare a ‘realist’ with a ‘social-relational’ perspective on our judgments of the moral status of 
artificial agents (AAs).  I develop a realist position according to which the moral status of a being - 
particularly in relation to moral patiency attribution - is closely bound up with that being’s ability to 
experience states of conscious satisfaction or suffering (CSS).  For a realist both moral status and 
experiential capacity are objective properties of agents. A social-relationist denies the existence of any such 
objective properties in the case of either moral status or consciousness, suggesting that the determination of 
such properties are rests solely upon social attribution or consensus.  A wide variety of social interactions 
between us and various kinds of artificial agent will no doubt proliferate in future generations, and the social-
relational view may well be right that the appearance of CSS-features in such artificial beings will make 
moral-role attribution socially prevalent in human-AA relations. But there is still the question of what actual 
CSS states a given AA is actually capable of undergoing, independently of the appearances.  This is not just 
a matter of changes in the structure of social existence that seem inevitable as human-AA interaction 
becomes more prevalent.  The social world is itself enabled and constrained by the physical world, and by 
the biological features of living social participants.  Features analogous to physiological features in 
biological CSS are what need to be present for non-biological CSS.  Working out the details of such features 
will be an objective scientific inquiry. 
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The term ‘society’ is currently understood to include humans – with various non-human biological species 
(e.g. domestic creatures, primates, etc.) sometimes included for certain purposes.  Humans may be soon 
joined on the planet by a number of new categories of agents with intelligence-levels that – according to 
certain measures – approach or even exceed those of humans.  These include robots, software agents, bio-
engineered organisms, humans and other natural creatures with artificial implants and prostheses, and so on. 
It may well become widely accepted (by us humans) that it is appropriate to expand the term ‘society’ to 
include many of such emerging artificial social beings, if their cognitive capacities and the nature of their 
interactions with humans are seen as being sufficiently fluent and complex to merit it.  Of the many 
questions that may be asked of new members of such an expanded society, two important ones are:  Are they 
conscious?  What kind of moral status do they have?  These questions form part of two new offshoot studies 
within AI – Machine  Consciousness and Machine Ethics (or Artificial Consciousness/Ethics). Wallach et al 
(2011) have written that ‘Machine ethics and machine consciousness are joined at the hip’.1  In what follows 
                                                
1  Wallach et al. are primarily concerned in their paper with how modelling moral agency requires a proper theoretical 
treatment of conscious ethical decision-making , whereas the present paper is more broadly concerned with the problem 
of ethical consideration – that is:  what kinds of machines, or artificial agents in general, merit ethical consideration 
either as agents or as patients.  The discussion largely centres around the relation between experiential consciousness 
and the status of moral patiency.  I’ve discussed the general relation between consciousness and ethics in an AI context 
in Torrance, 2008, 2011, 2012a,b; Torrance & Roche, 2011.  While I sympathize strongly with the sentiment expressed 
in the above quote from Wallach et al., I prefer the terms ‘Artificial Consciousness’ (AC), and ‘Artificial Ethics’ (AE) 
to the ‘Machine’ variants.  It seems clear that many future agents at the highly bio-engineered end of the spectrum of 
possible artificial agents – particularly those with near-human levels of cognitive ability - will be strong candidates to 
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we will find several ways in which these two domains cross-fertilize. Most prominently in the present 
discussion is the fact that the attribution of consciousness to machines, or artificial agents more generally 
(AAs)2, seems to be a fundamental consideration in assessing the ethical status of artificial social beings – 
both as moral agents and as moral patients.   
 
So how are we to understand such consciousness-attributions; and indeed, how are we to view attributions of 
moral status themselves?   I compare two views on these linked questions.  One view may be called ‘moral 
realism’ (or ‘realism’ for short).  For a realist, there are objectively correct answers to questions like: ‘Is X a 
conscious creature or agent?’; ‘Is X the kind of being that has moral value?’ – although it may be impossible, 
even in principle, to provide assured or non-controversial answers to such questions. I will defend a variant 
of this view here.  The other view may be called ‘social relationism’ (hereafter ‘relationism’ or SR for 
short).3   Social relationists deny that questions such as the above have objective answers, instead claiming 
that their determination relies solely upon social conditions, so that the process of ascribing properties such 
as ‘being conscious’, ‘having moral status’, involves an implicit relation to the ascriber(s).  Different 
versions of relationism are presented by Mark Coeckelbergh and David Gunkel in their two excellent recent 
books (Coeckelbergh 2012; Gunkel 2012; see also Coeckelbergh, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Gunkel, 2007, 2013).  
Despite initial appearances, much of the disagreement between realism and SR can be removed; 
nevertheless, a considerable core of variance will remain.  Questions about sentience or consciousness, on 
the one hand, and about moral status on the other, will provide two pivotal dilemmas for the members of any 
future expanded society.  The issue between these two views will thus be likely to be of crucial importance 
for how social life is to be organized in future generations..     
 
In the way that I will understand them, realism and SR are views both about ethical status and about 
sentience or consciousness.  A question such as ‘What moral status does X have (if any)?’ – supposing X to 
be a machine, a human, a dolphin, or whatever - can be construed in a realist or in a relationist way.  Equally, 
a question such as ‘Is X conscious?’ can also be given either a realist or a relationist construal.   
 
2 THE DEBATE ILLUSTRATED AND DEVELOPED 
 
In order to see the difference between the realist and the relationist approaches, consider a hypothetical 
future robot and its human owner. Let’s say the robot works as a gardener for the household where it is 
domiciled. We can think of the garden-bot here as being a ‘robot’ along broadly conventional lines:  that is, 
as a manufactured humanoid physical agent with a silicon-based brain.  We will assume that the robot is 
capable of communicating and interacting with humans in a relatively rich way.  Sadly, the human owner in 
our example regularly treats her charge in ways that cause the robot (in virtue of its design) to give 
convincing behavioural manifestations of distress, or even of pain, whenever its lawn-mowing, planting or 
weeding don’t come up to scratch.  Two natural questions might be:  (Q1) ‘Is the robot gardener really 
feeling distress or pain?’ and (Q2) ‘Is it really ethically ok for the owner to behave that way to the robot?’  
Q1 and Q2 seem to be linked – it might be natural to say that it would be wrong to treat the robot in that way 
if and in so far as it would cause it experiences of distress, etc.  
 
It might be objected that these two questions are dogged by so many indeterminacies that it is impossible to 
give any clear meaning to either of them.  On Q1:  How are we to think of the ‘pain’ or ‘distress’ of the robot 
gardener?  Can we imagine any such states in an electronic robot – however sophisticated its design and 
construction?  Can this be done in any way that avoids anthropomorphizing in a fashion that obscures, rather 
than clarifies the issue? How could the similarities or differences be characterized, when comparing ‘silicon-
                                                                                                                                                            
be considered both as phenomenally conscious much in the way we are and as moral beings (both as moral agents and 
as moral patients).  Yet it may be thought rather forced to call such artificial creatures ‘machines’, except in the 
stretched sense in which all natural organisms, us included, may be classed as machines.  
2 In what follows I will sometimes talk about ‘robots’ and sometimes about ‘artificial agents’ (AAs).  Generally, I will 
mean, by ‘robots’ physical agents (possibly humanoid in character), which are constructed using something like current 
robotic technology – that is, whose control mechanisms are computer-based (or based on some future offshoot from 
present-day computational designs).  By ‘AAs’ I will understand a larger class of agents, which includes ‘robots’ but 
which will also include various kinds of possible future bio-machine hybrids, plus also agents which, while synthetic or 
fabricated, may be partially or fully organic or metabolic in physical make-up.   
3 A source for the term ‘social relationism’ is the title of a paper by Mark Coeckelbergh (Coeckelbergh 2010a). 
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based pain’ (were such to exist) with ‘organic pain’?  There seems to be such a conceptual chasm between 
the familiar cases and the robot case that it may be thought that Q1 simply cannot be properly posed, at least 
in any direct, simple way.  And on Q2:  how are we to think of ethical duties towards silicon-based 
creatures?  As with Q1, it might be argued that the question of ethical treatment posed in Q2 cannot be given 
a clear construal when divorced from the context of inter-human or at least inter-organism relations.4   
 
Despite these doubts, I believe a realist can insist that the issues raised in Q1 and Q2 are genuine concerns:  
for example one wants to know whether there is something that the robot’s owner is doing wrong to the 
robot, in virtue of some real states that the robot is undergoing as a result of her actions. Do we, ethically, 
need to care about such actions, in the way we would about human distress or pain?  Do we need to waste 
resources protecting such agents (of which there may be many) from ‘ill-treatment’? Such questions may be 
hard to put into clear conceptual focus, let alone to answer definitively.  But surely they do seem to address 
strong prima facie concerns that might be raised about the kind of example we are considering.  In any case, 
for now we are simply putting forward the realist’s position:  a more considered appraisal will follow when 
we have examined both positions in greater detail. 
 
On the SR position neither Q1 nor Q2 has an inherently right or wrong answer.  Rather, answers will emerge 
from the ways in which society comes to develop beliefs and attitudes towards robots and other artificial 
agents.  Indeed a social-relationist may well insist that the sense that can be made of these questions, let 
alone the answers given to them, is something which itself only emerges in time with social debate and 
action.  Perhaps society will broadly adopt a consensus and perhaps it won’t:  but, for a supporter of SR, 
there is no way one can talk of the ‘correct’ answers to either question over and above the particular 
responses that emerge through socially accepted attitudes and patterns of behaviour.  
 
A relationist, then, would deny that there is any ‘correctness’ dimension to either Q1 or Q2 over and above 
what kinds of options happen to emerge within different social settings.  In contrast, for a realist, social 
consensus could really get things wrong – both on the psychological issue of whether the robot is feeling 
distress and pain and on the ethical issue of how the robot should be treated.  (Realists don’t have to link 
these two questions in this way, but it has been seen by many natural to do so, and that’s the version of 
realism that will be in the forefront of the discussion here.)  5,6 
 
So for a realist the following concerns can be raised.  A future generation of robot-owners may believe that 
some or even most of them are conscious or sentient, and therefore deserving of our moral concern in 
various ways, when ‘in fact’ they are no more sentient than (present-day) sit-on mowers, and can suffer only 
in the sense in which a mower would ‘suffer’ if the wrong fuel mix was used in its engine.  Or it might go 
the other way round – socially-prevalent attitudes may withhold attributions of conscious feeling and/or 
moral consideration to certain kinds of artificial agent who ‘in fact’ are conscious and merit moral 
consideration – and perhaps that the latter is the case for such agents largely, or at least partially, because of 
                                                
4 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for insisting on this point.  In the present discussion I am limiting the kinds of 
cases under consideration to AAs whose design involves electronic technologies which are relatively easy to imagine, 
on the basis of the current state of the art and of fairly solid future projections.  There are a wide variety of other kinds 
of artificial creature – including ones with various kinds of artificial organic makeup, plus bio-machine hybrids of 
different sorts – which expand considerably on this range of cases. We will consider this broader range of cases in later 
sections.   
Concentrating at the present stage of the discussion on AAs like the robot gardener, and other such, relatively 
conservative cases, has a triple utility.  First, it allows us to lay down the foundations for the argument without bringing 
in too many complexities for now. Second, many people (supporters of strong AI, or ‘strong artificial consciousness’) 
have asserted that such robots could well have genuinely conscious states (and thus qualify for serious ethical 
consideration) if constructed with the right (no doubt highly complex) functional designs.  Third, such cases seem to 
offer a greater challenge than cases which are closer-to-biology:  it’s precisely the non-organic cases, in which one has 
detailed similarity to humanity in terms of behavior and functional organization but marked dissimilarity in terms of 
physical or somatic structure, where the issues seem to be raised particularly sharply.   
5 Some people might agree that Q1 should be construed in a realist way – what could be more real than a person’s vivid 
experiences of distress, pleasure, etc.? – while being reluctant to treat Q2, and similar moral questions, in a realist or 
objectivist way.  In this paper I am supporting a realist position for both experiential and moral attributions.    
6 For a defence of the view that there is a close association between questions of consciousness and those of moral 
status, see, for example, Levy, 2009.  Versions of this view are defended in Torrance, 2012; Torrance & Roche 2011. 
The conclusions Levy comes to on the basis of these views are very different from mine, however. 
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the facts of the former kind that hold true of them.  (The scare-quoted phrase ‘in fact’ in the above will, of 
course, be problematic on the SR view.)   
 
According to realism, then, a question like ‘Is X conscious?’ is asking about objective7 matters of fact 
concerning X’s psychological state, and further (for this version of realism) attributions of moral status at 
least partially supervene on X’s psychological properties (including consciousness and related states).  
Moreover, on the version of realism being considered here, this is true of humans and non-human biological 
species, just as much for (current or future) robots and other technological agents.  So on this view normative 
moral questions concerning the actions or the treatment of humans, animals or robots, are closely bound up 
with factual questions concerning the capacity of these various agents for conscious experience – that is, the 
phenomenal consciousness of such agents, as opposed merely to their ability to function cognitively in a way 
a conscious being would.8  
 
Why should questions about the phenomenal consciousness of beings link so closely to moral questions? A 
key reason that the realist can put forward is to do with the fact that conscious experiences of different sorts 
have characteristic positive or negative affective valences or qualities.9 Think of the current field of your 
experiential awareness.  Experiences sometimes come in an affectively neutral way, such as the tiles on the 
floor which are in the background of my present visual awareness.  But others are evaluatively graded: the 
hum of the fan system that I can hear is mildly irritating; the lilt of voices in conversation outside my 
window is mildly pleasant. Plunging into a rather cold sea will generate a mix of sensations, of a 
characteristic hedonic character (a different mix for different people, situations, moods, etc.)  In general the 
flow of our experience is closely tied to our desires, needs, aversions, plans, etc., as these unfold in lived 
time.  The degrees of positive or negative affective valence can vary from scarcely noticeable to extreme, 
and, as they vary, so too do the contributions that they make to a conscious creature’s levels of satisfaction 
and suffering, i.e. to their experienced well-being or ill-being.  (It would seem to be difficult to see how 
beings which were not capable of conscious experience could have such states of satisfaction and suffering.) 
Further, it can be argued that considerations of how actions make a difference to the well-being, satisfaction, 
etc. of people affected by those actions is a central concern of ethics.  So an important part of a being’s moral 
status is determined by that being’s capacity to experience such states of satisfaction/suffering.   
 
The social-relational view, by contrast, claims that attributions of consciousness are not (or at least not 
clearly) ascriptions of matters of objective fact, at least in the case of non-human animals, and of current and 
future technological agents. On this view such ascriptions have instead to be understood in terms of the 
organizational circumstances in the society in which the discourse of attribution occurs, on the social 
relations between human moral agents, and the contexts in which other putatively conscious creatures or 
agents may enter into our social lives.  These social and technical contexts vary from culture to culture and 
from epoch to epoch.  Society is fast-changing today, so new criteria for consciousness-attribution may 
currently be emerging, which are likely to radically alter social opinion on what beings to treat as conscious 
(indeed what beings count as ‘social beings’ will itself be a socially ‘moving target’).  Moreover, on the SR 
view, attributions of moral worth and other moral qualities are similarly to be seen as essentially embedded 
in social relations.  The same profound changes in social view are likely to affect norms concerning the 
attribution of moral status, in particular the moral status of artificial creatures.  In a word, judgments in the 
21st century about the possible experiential and moral status of automata may markedly diverge from those 
that were prevalent in previous centuries.  The SR view will say there can be no neutral way of judging 
between these different views.  Thus, on the relationist view, both the psychological and the ethical 
components of the realism described above are rejected.10 
 
 
                                                
7 To clarify: the realist’s claim is that ‘Is X conscious’ is objective in the sense that ‘X is currently conscious’ asserts a 
historical fact about X, even though it’s a fact about X’s subjective state, unlike, say, ‘X is currently at the summit of 
Everest’.   
8 The inherent distinguishability between phenomenal and functional consciousness is defended in Torrance, 2012.    
9 See Thompson, 2007, chapter 12, for a discussion of the relation between consciousness, affect and valence. 
10 This is not to say that questions concerning consciousness or ethics in relation to such machines are to be thought of 
as trivial or inconsequential on the SR view: on the contrary, a relationist will take such questions as seriously as the 
realist, and may claim that they deserve our full intellectual and practical attention.   
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3  THE EXPANDING MORAL CIRCLE AND THE LANDSCAPE OF CONSCIOUS 
WELL-BEING 
 
Many writers have talked of a progressive expansion of moral outlook through human pre-history and 
history.  Peter Singer has written persuasively (Singer, 2011) of the ‘expanding circle’ of ethical concern, 
from primitive kin- and tribe-centred fellow-feeling to a universal regard for all of humanity; and of the 
rational imperative to widen the circle still further to include non-human creatures capable of sentient 
feeling. According to Singer, we owe our ethics to the evolutionary pressures on our pre-human forbears, 
and we owe it to the animal co-descendents of that evolutionary process to extend ethical concern to the 
well-being of all sentient creatures.11   
 
Some have argued that the circle should be widened so that non-sentient entities such as forests, mountains, 
oceans, etc. should be included within the domain of direct moral consideration (rather than just 
instrumentally, in terms of how they affect the well-being of sentient creatures - see, for example, Leopold, 
1948, Naess, 1973.)  In considering what limits might be put on this process of ethical expansion, Singer 
argues that only entities that have the potentiality for sentience could sensibly be included in the moral circle.  
For, he says, of a being with no sentience there can be nothing that one can do which could make a 
difference to that being in terms of what it might experience (Singer, 2011, p. 123.) 
 
Singer’s position appears to rest on a conceptual claim – that only beings with sentience can coherently be 
considered as moral patients.  As I see it his argument is roughly this.  For X to be a ‘moral patient’ (or 
moral ‘recipient’) means (at least in part) that X is capable of benefitting or suffering from a given action; 
and a non-sentient being cannot benefit or suffer in the relevant (experiential) sense (although, like a lawn-
mower run continually on the wrong fuel mix, or operated over a rocky terrain, it may ‘suffer’ or be ‘abused’ 
in a functional, and non-experiential, sense).  So, the argument goes, a non-sentient being cannot coherently 
be considered as a moral patient, because no action could affect its consciousness of its own well-being.  
Ethical considerations are about how our actions might affect others (and ourselves) in ways that make a 
difference to those so affected..  To quote from an earlier work of Singer’s (1975, 9): ‘A stone does not have 
interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its 
welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being kicked along the road, because it will 
suffer if it is.’ (cited in Gunkel 2012, p. 113.)   
 
Of course the precise conditions under which particular artificial agents might be considered as conscious – 
as a being having interests, like the mouse, rather than as a brute, inanimate object, like the stone – are 
notoriously difficult to pin down.  But having controversial verification-conditions is not the same as having 
no verification-conditions, or ones which are essentially dependent upon the social-relational context.  
Compare, for example, the question of extra-terrestrial life.  There may be controversy among astrobiologists 
over the precise conditions under which life will be established to exist in a distant solar system; but this 
does not detract from the ontological objectivity of exoplanetary life as an real phenomenon in the universe.  
It does not make the physical universe, or the existence or nature of planets outside our solar system, social-
relational (although of course exoplanetary science, astrobiology, etc., as academic studies, are social 
activities, with their specific funding, geopolitical and ideological dimensions).  Similarly, the realist might 
say, a robot’s or AA’s pain, if such a thing were to exist, would be as objective a property of the AA, and as 
inalienable from the AA, as would your or my pain be inalienable from you or from me.  (Conversely, an AA 
that gave appearances of pain or suffering but which in fact had no sentience could not have sentience added 
to it simply by virtue of its convincing appearance.)12  
 
For realism, in the version I am developing here, there appears to be a kind of holism between thinking of X 
as phenomenally conscious and judging X to be of moral worth (at least as a moral patient, and maybe as a 
moral agent, in a full sense of agency).   This phenomenal-valuational holism may be put as follows.  To 
think of a creature as having conscious experience is to think of it as capable of experiencing things in either 
a positively or negatively valenced way – to think of it as having desires, needs, goals, and states of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction or suffering.  Of course there are neutral experiential states, and not all 
                                                
11 See also the discussion in Torrance, 2013.   
12 Singer does not discuss the case of moral interests of robots or other artificial agents (or indeed of exoplanetary 
beings) in his 2011 book. 
 6 
satisfaction or suffering is consciously experienced.  Nor are all our goals concerned with gaining particular 
experienced satisfactions. Nevertheless there seems to be a strong connection between our experiential 
capacities and our potential for well-being.  (This is a point which has been addressed surprisingly little in 
the literature on human consciousness, and of machine consciousness.)  We may talk of beings which are 
conscious, in this rich sense, as having the capacity for conscious/satisfaction/suffering states.  I’ll here call 
these CSS states for short. 
 
Not all realists may agree with this kind of phenomenal-valuational holism.  One writer who seems to do so 
is Sam Harris.  He presents the view (Harris, 2010) that the well-being of conscious creatures is the central 
issue in ethics, and indeed that other ethical considerations are, if not nonsensical, at root appeals to 
consideration of experienced well-being – to the quality of CSS states.  Harris’s moral landscape is the 
terrain of possible peaks and troughs in experienced well-being that CSS-capable creatures negotiate through 
their lives.  He also argues (in a particularly strong version of the realist position) that moral questions are 
objective and in principle scientific in nature.  As a neuroscientist, Harris takes brain-processes to be central 
determinants of well- or ill-being – a view I would accept only with strong qualification. It may be hard in 
practice to solve various moral dilemmas, but, he claims, they are in principle amenable to a scientific 
solution, like other tough factual questions such as curing cancer or eliminating global poverty.   
 
I don’t necessarily say ethics is exclusively about well-being; but I would agree that it is central to ethics.  
Also, since creatures with capacities for greater or lesser well-being are conscious, I think it is central to the 
study of consciousness, and, indeed to AI.  Of course physiological processes from the neck upwards are 
pretty crucial for such capacities.  But, pace Harris, bodily processes from the neck down are pretty 
important too, as well as the active engagement of the creature in its lived world.13  A big challenge for AI 
and Artificial Ethics is to work out just what physical features need to be present both above and below the 
neck in artificial agents for artificially-generated CSS properties to be present, and how close they have to be 
with the relevant natural or organic features.14 
 
Linked with his views about the scientific grounding of questions to do with well-being and ethics, Harris 
expresses a lot of impatience with the ‘fact-value’ split that has dominated scientific thinking in the last 
century, and for the moral neutralism or quietism that has characterized a lot of scientific thought and 
practice in that time.  I very much agree with Harris on this, and would say that it has been particularly true 
of ‘Cognitive Science’ as this has developed in the last half-century or so.  The over-cognitivizing of the 
mind has had an unfortunate effect both on the attempt to understand mental processes scientifically, and on 
the process of exploring the ethical ramifications of mind science.  AI researchers, neuroscientists, 
psychologists and philosophers have too often talked as though the mind was exclusively a cognitive 
mechanism. All that cognitivizing hard work; that systematic redescription of the chiaroscuro of our desires, 
emotions, pains and delights in terms of informational operations; that bleaching out of happiness and misery 
from the fabric of our psychology; all that has, arguably, been to the detriment of both scientific 
understanding and ethical discussion in this area.  
 
4  THE TURING DREAM:  A 400-YEAR SCENARIO 
 
I thus applaud the science-ethics holism found in objectivist writers like Harris.  Perhaps this enthusiasm will 
be shared by relationists such as Coeckelbergh and Gunkel.  It is certainly interesting to discuss machine 
ethics in a way that takes seriously the inherent interconnectivity of consciousness, well-being and ethics, 
and which allows that scientific and ethical issues are not to be debated in parallel, hermetically sealed 
chambers.15   
 
                                                
13 For an excellent, and fully elaborated, defence of the kind of view of consciousness that I would accept, which is 
centred around notions of enactivism and autopoiesis, see Thompson, 2007 – especially chapters 12 and 13.  There is no 
space here to do more than gesture to this view in the present discussion.   
14 Like Singer, Harris does not consider the ethical status of possible artificial agents. 
15 Sometimes the seals can be leaky.  I was once at a conference on consciousness, where an eminent neuropsychologist 
was giving a seminar on ethical issues in neural research on consciousness.  He said things like ‘With my 
neuroscientist’s cap on, I think . . .  But with my ethicist’s cap on, I think . . .’  What cap was he wearing when deciding 
which cap to put on at a given time?   
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In the light of this, consider the following possible future picture. Let us consider what might be called the 
‘Turing Dream’ – that is, the goal aspired to by many in the AI community of developing the kind of 
complexity and subtlety in functioning which would enable robots to behave more or less like us over a very 
broad range of activities and competencies in the physical and social real world. Let us suppose (a big ask!) 
that researchers do not hit any insurmountable barriers of computational tractability, hardware speed, or 
other performance or design impasses, and the ‘dream’ is fulfilled, so that such robots proliferate in our 
world, and co-habit with us in a more or less peaceable kingdom. Let us suppose, then, that – say –  400 
years from now (or choose the timeframe you prefer), human social relations have changed radically because 
of the existence of large numbers of such artificial agents implementing more-or-less-human or even greater-
than-human levels of ability across a wide range of capabilities.  If the Turing Dream were to come about in 
something like this fashion, many people will find it natural to attribute a wide range of psychological 
attributes to such agents, and the agents themselves will, in their communications with us and with each 
other, represent themselves as having many of the cognitive and indeed affective states that we currently take 
to be characteristic of human psychology.  Many such artificial creatures may resemble humans in outward 
form.  Even if they don’t, and the technology of humanoid robotics runs into a cul-de-sac, it nevertheless 
seems likely that the demands of extensive human-AI social interaction will ensure a good deal of 
resemblance in non-bodily respects (for instance in terms of sharing common languages, participating in a 
common economic system, shared legal frameworks, and so on).   
 
Will our world wind up at all like this? Who knows?  But the scenario will help us check our intuitions.  
Humans in this imagined future period may ask: are such artificial agents conscious?  And, should we admit 
such agents into our moral universe, and in what ways? (And by what right are we licensed to talk of 
admitting ‘them’ into ‘our’ moral world?)  As we have argued, such questions are closely linked.  We can 
combine those questions together in a third: do such artificial agents have CSS-features?  The social-
relationist will say that the answer to these questions will depend on the prevailing social conditions at the 
time, on what kinds of attitudes, beliefs, forms of life, and ways of articulating or representing social reality 
come to emerge in such a joint human-technological social milieu.  On the relational view, there will be no 
‘objective’ way, independently of the socially dominant assumptions, judgments, norms and institutions that 
grow up as such artificial agents proliferate, to say whether they are actually conscious, whether they 
actually are capable of having states of felicity or suffering, or whether they actually merit particular kinds of 
moral consideration - e.g. whether they merit having their needs taken roughly as seriously as equivalent 
human needs; whether their actions merit appraisal in roughly similar moral terms as the equivalent actions 
of humans, etc.16 
 
For the realist this would miss an important dimension:  do such artificial creatures (a few or a many of 
them) actually bear conscious states, are they actually capable of experiencing states of satisfaction or 
suffering at levels comparable to ours (or at lower, or even much higher, levels – or even in ways that can’t 
easily be ranked in terms of any serial comparison of ‘level’ to ours)?  To see the force of the realist’s 
argument, consider how a gathering of future artificial agents might discuss the issue with respect to 
humans’ having CSS properties - perhaps at a convention to celebrate the 500th anniversary of Turing’s 
birth?17 Let’s suppose that delegates’ opinions divide along roughly similar lines to those in the current 
human debate, with social-relationists arguing that there is no objective fact of the matter about whether 
humans have CSS properties, and realists insisting that there must be a ‘fact of the matter’.18  
 
How would a human listening in on this argument feel about such a discussion?  I would suggest that only a 
few philosophically sophisticated folks would feel comfortable with the relationist side of the argument in 
                                                
16 It’s worth pointing out that no consensual human view may come to predominate on these issues:  there may rather be 
a fundamental divergence just as there is in current societies between liberals and conservatives, or between theistic and 
humanistic ways of thinking, or between envirocentric versus technocentric attitudes towards the future of the planet, 
and so on.  In such a case, the relationist could say, social reality will be just as it manifests itself – one in which no 
settled view on the psychological or moral status of such agents comes to prevail; society will just contain irreconcilable 
social disagreements on these matters, much as it does today on these other issues. 
17 The present paper originated as a contribution to a workshop at a Convention celebrating the 100th anniversary of 
Turing’s birth. 
18 We assume – perhaps with wild optimism – that that these artificial agents are by then smart enough to debate such 
matters somewhat as cogently as humans can today, if not much more so.  To get a possible flavour of the debate, 
consider Terry Bisson’s ‘They’re made out of meat’ (Bisson, 1991).  
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this robot convention, and that the most instinctive human response would be a realist one. A human would 
reflect that we do, as a species, clearly possess a wide variety of CSS properties – indeed our personal and 
social lives revolve 24/7 around such properties.  Can there be any issue over which there is more 
paradigmatically a ‘fact of the matter’ than our human consciousness? Surely the ‘facts’ point conclusively 
to the presence of CSS properties in humans: and are not such properties clearly tied to deep and extensive 
(neuro)physiological features in us?  What stronger evidence-base for any ‘Is X really there?’ question could 
there be than the kind of evidence we have for CSS properties in humanity?  So surely robots a century from 
now would be right to adopt a realist view about the consciousness and ethical status of humans.  Should we 
then not do the same today (or indeed in a hundred years’ time) of robots? 19 
5  THE OTHER MINDS PROBLEM PROBLEMATIZED  
A supporter of SR might raise ‘other-minds’-style difficulties even about CSS in humans, as a way of 
highlighting the difficulty of certifying the existence of CSS properties in artificial agents.20  Any individual 
human’s recognition of CSS properties is based upon their own direct first-person experience.  There are 
great psychological and social pressures on any individual to infer to the existence of such CSS properties in 
others, it might be said:  yet the inference can never rationally be fully justified, since one can never be 
directly acquainted with another person’s conscious states.  It appears that one has to infer to the internal 
states of another’s consciousness on analogy with bodily and physiological states observed in oneself as 
these are linked with one’s own experience.  As Wittgenstein remarked, with a whiff of sarcasm, ‘how can I 
generalize the one case so irresponsibly?’  (Wittgenstein, 1953: I, §293).    The ‘other minds’ problem may 
thus be used as a device for undermining realism, by emphasizing that even in the case of other humans, let 
alone various species of animals, there are substantial difficulties in establishing the presence of the kinds of 
experiential properties that the realist requires for ethical attribution.21 
There are several responses to such doubts.  A first response is this.  If CSS properties are not completely 
mysterious and inexplicable, from a scientific point of view, then they must be causally grounded in natural 
features of any individual human possessing them. Imagine two humans, A and B, who display third-person 
behavioural and physiological properties that were identical in all relevant respects, yet where A has an 
‘inner’ phenomenological life and B lacks all phenomenological experience.  This would be a completely 
bizarre phenomenon, to be explained either in terms of some non-natural circumstance (e.g. God chose to 
inject a phenomenology into A but withhold it from the physically-identical B) – or else it would have to be 
completely inexplicable.  Neither of these alternatives seems attractive.  Yet to entertain radical doubts about 
other minds seems to require embracing one or other of these unsavoury positions.  To avoid that, it would 
be necessary to concede that there are some sort of third-person, underpinning natural features, publicly 
accessible in principle, that could be used to distinguish those humans (and other species) with a 
phenomenology, with CSS features, from those without.  In any case, there is a mass of scientific theory and 
accreted experimental data linking CSS properties in humans, and affective properties more generally, with 
our evolutionary history, and with our current biological and neural make-up.     
Doubts about solipsism and the existence of other human consciousnesses besides one’s own, can also be 
shown to be fed by a series of questionable fundamental conceptions about mind and consciousness in the 
first place.  Solipsistic doubts are linked to doubts about the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness (Chalmers, 
1995; Shear, 1997); the Explanatory Gap between physiology and experience (Levine, 1983); Absent Qualia 
puzzles (Block, 1978); and so on. I have suggested (Torrance, 2007) that there are two contrasting 
conceptions of phenomenality: the ‘thin’ (or ‘shallow’) conception, deriving from Descartes’ radical doubts 
about bodily existence in the face of the cogito, assumes that consciousness must be understood in terms of a 
radically ego-logical sensory presence, which is causally, ontologically and conceptually, radically separate 
                                                
19 That is, should we not say that the epistemological status of our question about them is comparable to that of theirs 
about us? – although the answers to the two questions may be very different, as may be the relative difficulty in 
answering them.  
20 See, for example, Gunkel, 2012, Chapters 1 and 2, who insists on the perennial philosophical problem of ‘other 
minds’ as a reason for casting doubts on rational schemes of ethical extension which might enlarge the sphere of moral 
agency or patiency to animals of different types, and beyond that, to machines.  It is remarkable how frequently Gunkel 
returns to rehearsing the theme of solipsistic doubt in his discussion.  
21 Appeal to doubts over other minds is one of the arguments used by Turing to buttress his early defence of the 
possibility of thinking, and indeed conscious, machines (Turing, 1950). 
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from any other processes (particularly bodily or physiological processes).  By contrast, the ‘thick’ (or ‘deep’) 
conception sees consciousness as conceptually inseparable from the lived, physiological processes that make 
up a conscious being’s embodied existence. The distinction is deployed in that paper to articulate an 
embodied approach to Machine Consciousness (see also Holland, 2007, Stuart, 2007, Ziemke, 2007).  In a 
later paper I have argued for an embodied, de-solipsized conception of consciousness, by challenging 
prevailing ‘myths’ which construe consciousness as being, by definition, essentially inner, hidden and 
individualistic (Torrance, 2009).  I suggest that consciousness is an ‘essentially contested’ notion (the term is 
due to Gallie, 1955) – so that, at the very least, there is no requirement that consciousness be conceptualized 
in the ways suggested by these ‘myths’. 
Freed from the necessity to rely on internalist and individuocentric conceptions of consciousness, one is able 
to see how philosophical worries to do with solipsism, absent qualia, the explanatory gap between the neural 
and the phenomenal, and so on, are all systematic products of a dependence by many sectors of the 
philosophical and scientific community (a dependence which both feeds from and into unreflective idioms of 
folk talk about mind) upon an outmoded and unhelpful way of conceptualizing experience or phenomenality.  
Many other authors have articulated versions of this richer, more deeply embodied, conception of 
phenomenality.  A notable critique of the mind-body problem by Hanna and Thompson differerentiates 
between two conceptions of body – the body of the physical organism which is the subject of biological 
investigation as a physical-causal system (Körper) and the ‘lived body’ (Leib), which is the individual 
subject of embodied experience of an organism as it makes sense of its trajectory in its world (Hanna & 
Thompson, 2003). Hanna and Thompson deploy the Leib-Körper distinction to dissolve doubts over mind-
body separation, other minds, and so on, by bifurcating notions of body, in contrast to the distinction 
between notions of phenomenality in Torrance, 2007.22   Other philosophical challenges to the other minds 
problem will be found in Gallagher’s rejection of theory-theory and simulation-theory approaches to 
mentalization, which draw upon work by Husserl, Scheler, Gurwitsch, Trevarthen and others who argue that, 
for example, the perception of someone’s sadness is not an inference to a hidden X behind the expressive 
countenance, but is rather a direct observation of the other’s experiential state, derived from the condition of 
primary intersubjectivity with their conspecific carers that humans and other primates are born into, and the 
secondary intersubjectivity of joint-attention and engagement in joint projects in the world that occurs during 
later development (Gallagher, 2005a, 2005b; Zahavi, 2001; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Thompson, 2007.).  
Such work by Gallagher and others offers a strong alternative to opposed viewpoints in debates over the 
psychology of social cognition, but a fortiori, marginalize classical other-minds doubts as a philosophical 
side-show.      
6  SOCIAL AND NON-SOCIAL SHAPERS OF SOCIALITY 
We have seen, then, that to raise epistemological doubts which problematize our everyday assurance that we 
live in a community of consciousnesses is to rely on a cluster of problematic Cartesian assumptions which 
are based on options about how to conceptualize phenomenality which we are not forced to make, given 
alternative conceptual directions which many strong theoretical considerations direct us towards.23  But in 
any case such doubts can be shown to be irrelevant from an ethical point of view.  Ethics, while being based 
on a weighty body of theoretical discussion, stretching back millennia, is, above all, concerned with our 
practical, functioning, social lives.  In practice, we live in a non-solipistic world, a world which we cannot 
but live in as one of a community of co-phenomenality.   
If Ethics is about practice, it is also about sociality and interactivity.  The way I come to recognize and 
articulate CSS properties in myself is partly based upon my social interactions with my conspecifics.  Indeed, 
to deploy a serious point behind the Wittgenstein quip cited above (and much else in his later writings), my 
whole discourse about mind, consciousness, pain, desires, emotions, etc. is based upon the public forms of 
                                                
22 See also the treatment of this issue in Thompson, 2007, especially chapter 8 – therein called the ‘Body-Body 
problem’.  Thompson mentions that a quite elaborate range of notions contrasting and combining the motifs of Leib and 
Körper are found in Husserl’s writings (see Depraz, 1997, 2001, cited in Thompson, 2007, ch. 8, footnote 6).  
Thompson also critiques superficial or ‘thin’ conceptions of phenomenology (ibid., ch. 8) but without the ‘thin’/’thick’ 
terminology used in Torrance, 2007. 
23 A variety of sources, from phenomenology, and several of the mind sciences, all converging on the view that our 
understanding of mind is thoroughly intersubjective, in a way that renders solipsistic doubts incoherent, will be found in 
Thompson, ed, 2001, and Thompson, 2007. 
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life I share with other humans in the real world of participatory inter-subjectivity.  ‘Just try, in a real case’, 
Wittgenstein wrote, ‘to doubt someone’s fear and pain.’  (Wittgenstein, 1953, I, §203)    
Ironically, we here seem to find ourselves using an SR-style argument to counter an SR-style objection to 
realism.  But we need to be careful.  The relationist may argue that the very Wittgenstinian considerations 
just mentioned (and related arguments for the necessary public, social grounding of such recognition, and on 
the impossibility of private language and private cognitive rules, etc.) shed doubt on the objectivity of first-
personal recognition of CSS properties.  Such a suggestion needs to be taken seriously, and may point to a 
deep truth behind the SR position – that our understanding of how we come to possess CSS properties, and 
of the variety of roles they play in our lives, is indeed inextricably bound up with our social relationships and 
activities.   
 
But it’s also important to see that the dependency also goes in the other direction.  Our consciousness, needs, 
desires, etc. are what give point and form to our sociality. Our social conditions partly gain their significance 
from these very experiential and appetitive features in our lives, including, centrally, the ups of happiness 
and downs of misery.  It is vital not to assume that everything in human lived experience is subject to social 
shaping: the reverse is also true. Myriad ‘objective’ physical and biological realities – including a variety of 
evolutionary, neural and physiological constraints – come into this network of inter-relations between 
consciousness and the social.  Evolutionary history and current brain-patterns play crucial roles in what 
makes us feel good or bad, as do the materiality of our bodies and the dynamics of their interactions with 
other bodies and the surrounding physical world.  So there is a multi-directional cluster of mutually 
constitutive and constraining relationships between the social, material, biological and experiential factors in 
our lives.24  What makes up our CSS features emerges from the entanglement of these various kinds of 
factors.  This brings us to the heart of the question of CSS in future artificial social agents.   
 
The progress of current work in AI teaches us that many of the features of human-human social and 
communicative interaction – the ‘outer’ features, at least – can be replicated via techniques in computer and 
robotic science – essentially algorithmic modelling techniques.  Increasingly our social world is being filled 
with human-machine and machine-machine interactions.  With the growing ubiquity of such interactions, the 
range of possible social action is gradually being extended.  But also, our very conceptions of the social, the 
cultural and the intersubjective, are being re-engineered.  Or, to put the point a different way:  how we make 
sense of the social, and indeed how we make sense of ‘we’, is being continually reshaped by our artefacts as 
they are increasingly implicated in our social existence.  This is a crucial point that the relationist seeks to 
emphasize, in the debate about the status of CSS properties; and the realist must also acknowledge it readily.   
 
Of course, notions related to social status overlap intimately with ethical notions; and the SR account is well 
suited to provide a theoretical framework for much of the domain of the social. So what is taken to constitute 
‘the social’ is itself largely shaped by social factors, and changes as new social possibilities emerge.  But, as 
we suggested earlier, the domain of the social is also shaped and constrained by the non-social, including 
biological and other kinds of physical conditions, and the experiences, desires, beliefs, goals, etc. of social 
participants.   So, many of the novel forms of human-AA and AA-AA social relationships that will emerge 
(and already have been emerging) will take their character not merely from the social sphere itself but also 
from the non-social soil in which sociality is rooted – that is, from the multiple physical, environmental, and 
indeed metabolic and experiential drivers of sociality. This is particularly true of those social relationships 
between humans and the computationally organized machines of today (let alone future, more organically 
constituted, AAs).  Arguably, there are a great many social relationships, even today, which are precisely 
NOT relations between creatures with shared physiologies. And, for robots and other artificial agents of 
today, we can surely say with near certainty that they are NOT relations between beings with common 
experiential and affective subjectivities.   
 
7  THE ‘BIO/MACHINE’ SPECTRUM 
 
So it is likely that, for the short term, as long as we have only the relatively primitive designs of our current 
technologies, our artificial social partners are, objectively, partners with zero experiential or affective life 
                                                
24 And no doubt many others – for instance I have left out the essential role played by our cognitive capacities, by 
beliefs, perceptions, intellective skills, etc.! 
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(despite many vociferous assertions to the contrary).  Such artificial social partners are not, in Tom Regan’s 
phrase, ‘subjects of a life’ (Regan, 1983).   Thus, for now, the possibilities for social interaction with 
machines outstrip the possibility of those machines being capable of sharing such interactions as exchanges 
between experiencing, belief-and-desire-ful beings.  For now, any human-machine interaction is one 
between social partners where only one of the actors has any social concern.   Some of the deep conditions 
for sociality mentioned earlier are missing – in particular, a shared experientiality and shared 
neurophysiology.  In the human-machine case, then, we might talk of a current mismatch between social 
interactivity and social constitutivity.    
 
But how might things change in the medium and long-term?  For one thing, techniques in synthetic biology 
may develop in ways which allow biotechnologists to create agents that are not just functionally or 
behaviourally very close to humans – i.e. which exemplify social patterns in a variety of outward ways, but 
which are close also in detailed neural and physiological makeup.  In that, ex hypothesi, such creatures will 
share deep and extensive similarities with us in terms of the biological underpinnings of consciousness, we 
may indeed have little ground for denying that they are ‘objectively’ conscious, CSS-bearing, beings, with 
all the ethical consequences that would flow.   
 
We certainly cannot rule out, then, that there will at some future time be AAs with physiologies which are as 
close to those of humans as one cares to imagine.  Leaving aside the general ‘other minds’ objections 
discussed earlier, what reason would we have for saying that, despite our extensive biological commonality 
with such artificial creatures, they lacked the CSS features that we had – other than the (surely irrelevant?) 
fact that, unlike us, they were fabricated (or cultured) in a laboratory?  (Such AAs might even have 
ontogenetic histories very much like ours, progressing from a foetal or at least neonatal stage, through 
infancy, and so on.)  So, in the context of our present discussion, such very full-spec synthetic-biology-
based, humanoid creatures surely give support to the idea that at least some artificial agents should certainly 
be given the moral status that humans enjoy.  But such creatures occupy one extreme, bio-realistic, end, of a 
spectrum of possible artificial agents.  At the other extreme there are the relatively simplistic, computational 
AI agents of the recent past and of today – an era when artificial agent design is still, one assumes, in its 
infancy.25  And between those two extremes are a host of other imaginable and not-so-imaginable agent 
designs.  Clearly, as we retreat from the bio-realistic end, judgment calls about CSS properties and ethical 
status on the basis of physical design are much less straightforward.   
 
In many (middle) regions of the spectrum there will be agents with natural, fluent and subtle social 
interactivity characteristics that are close to those of humans, but where the underlying detailed physical 
design is remote from detailed humanoid or mammalian physical design.  These will offer the toughest cases 
for decision: agents that, via their fluent social capacities (and, in many varieties, outwardly human-like 
bodily features), display a wide variety of apparent CSS-evincing behaviours but where they share relatively 
few of the internal neurological and more broadly physiological features that make for the presence of CSS 
properties in humans.  These are the cases where the social-relational view may seem to be on its most solid 
ground:  what possible ‘objective’ basis could there be for deciding on whether to accord or withhold moral 
consideration in each particular class of example?  
 
However, a realist can reply that, even if such cases are difficult to determine in practice, there is still the 
question of what kind of experiential state, if any, actually occurs, independently of human or social 
attribution.  For such cases, then, there are many risks of false positives and false negatives in CSS-
attributions.  And surely it is the significance of such false positives and negatives that makes a difference – 
both in theoretical terms and in moral terms.  In the hypothetical situations where such agents exist in large 
numbers – where they multiply across the world as smartphones have done today – wrong judgments could 
have catastrophic societal implications:  (A) In the false-positive case, many resources useful for fulfilling 
human need might be squandered on satisfying apparent but illusory ‘needs’ of vast populations of 
behaviourally convincing but CSS-negative artificial agents.  (B) Conversely, in the false-negative case, vast 
                                                
25 For the sake of simplicity of discussion I’m here representing the spectrum as if it were a unidimensional space, 
whereas it is almost certainly more appropriate to see it as multidimensional. (See Sloman, 1984.) 
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populations of CSS-positive artificial agents may undergo extremes of injustice and suffering at the hands of 
humans that wrongly take them for socially-fluent zombies.26  
 
Given the existence of a large variety of different possible artificial agents, what David Gunkel (2007, 2012, 
2013) calls ‘The Machine Question’ (my emphasis) factors into a multiplicity of different questions, each 
one centred around a particular kind of machine (or AA) design.   Some kind of decision has to be made for 
each kind of machine design, and this is not going to be easy.  Nevertheless surely it’s not the case that the 
only option is to throw up one’s hands in resignation and just say “Let social consensus decide”. 
 
8   NEGOTIATING THE SPECTRUM 
 
So the bio-machine spectrum ranges from cases of very close bio-commonality at one end, to simplistic 
current-AI style behaviour matching at the other end.  At both these extremes decisions about CSS capacity 
and about moral status seem relatively straightforward – a resounding ‘yes’ at the first extreme, and a 
resounding ‘no’ at the other.  But what about the intermediate cases?  Is there any way to make progress on 
providing methods for adjudicating on moral status for the wide variety of hard cases between the two 
extremes?  I think that there is:  I believe it is possible to propose a series of testable conditions which can be 
applied to candidate artificial agents occupying different positions in the vast middle territory of the 
spectrum.  I list such a series of conditions below, well aware that this is only one person’s draft, no doubt 
skewed by the preoccupations and prejudices of its author.  Nevertheless it may point the way to showing 
how a realist position may be able to do more than simply say ‘There must be a correct answer to the 
question “Should A be accorded moral status?” for any given candidate agent A’, and may be able to offer 
something approaching a decision-procedure.27   Here, then, is the list: 
 
· NEURAL CONDITION: Having a neural structure (albeit not implemented in a conventional, biological 
way), which maps closely the features specified by theories of the neural (and sub-neural?) correlates of 
consciousness, according to the best neuroscience of the day. 
· METABOLIC CONDITION: Replicating (perhaps only in some analogical form) the more broadly 
physiological correlates of consciousness in humans and other organisms (including, e.g. blood 
circulation, muscular activities; alimentary processes; immune-system responses; endocrine/hormonal 
processes, etc., to the extent that these are variously considered to be essentially correlated with 
biologically occurring forms of consciousness). 
· ORGANIC CONDITION: Having a mechanism that supports consciousness that is organic in the sense 
of displaying self-maintaining/recreating (autopoietic) processes which require specific energy 
exchanges between the agent and its environment, and internal metabolic processes to support the 
continuation of these mechanisms and the maintenance of effective boundary conditions with respect to 
the surrounding environment. 
· DEVELOPMENTAL CONDITION:  Having a life-history that at least approximates to that of humans 
and other altricial creatures, with foetal, neonate, infant, etc. stages – involving embodied exploration, 
learning, primitive intersubjective relations with carers and teachers, and the capability to develop more 
complex forms of intersubjectivity.    
                                                
26 Here we are stressing moral patiency, but a similar problem of false-positives/false-negatives exists for moral agency, 
too.  Many relatively primitive kinds of AI agents will act in a functionally autonomous fashion so as to affect human 
well-being in many different ways – so in one sense the question of moral agency is much more pressing, as many 
authors have pointed out (see, for example, Wallach and Allen, 2010).  Yet there are important questions of 
responsibility-ascription that need to be determined.  If we provide too great a share of responsibility to AAs that act in 
ways that are detrimental to human interests, this may well mask the degree of responsibility that should be borne by 
particular humans in such situations (e.g. those who design, commission and use such AAs).  Conversely, we may 
overattribute responsibility to humans in such situations and withhold moral credit from artificial agents when in truth it 
is due to such agents, for example, on the grounds that as ‘mere machines’ they cannot be treated as fully responsible 
moral agents.  The vexed issue of moral responsibility in the case of autonomous lethal battlefield robots provides one 
illustration of this area: see Sparrow, 2007; Arkin, 2009; Sharkey & Suchman, 2013. 
27 It may well be that realism will not be defeated if no decision-procedure is provided.  There is the ontological matter 
of whether questions like “Does A have a moral status as an ethical patient/agent?” have a correct answer or not 
(independently of the accidents of social determination).  And there is the epistemological or methodological matter of 
whether or not it can be determined, in a straightforward way or even only with extreme difficulty, what the correct 
answer to that question is for any particular A.   
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· SENSORIMOTOR CONDITION:  Exemplifying forms of sensorimotor interaction with the 
environment, which are considered to be implicated in conscious perceptual activity  (See O’Regan & 
Noe, 2001; O’Regan, 2007.) 
· COGNITIVE CONDITION.  Displaying the various cognitive marks or accompaniments of 
consciousness, as identified by cognitive theories of consciousness.  
· SOCIAL CONDITION:  Generally interacting with humans (and other artificial agents) in a variety of 
social situations in a fluent and collaborative way.  (See Gallagher, 2012). 
· AFFECTIVE/WELFARE CONDITION:  Showing evidence of having an extended array of needs, 
desires, aversions, emotions, somewhat akin to those shown by humans and other natural creatures. 
· ETHICAL CONDITION:  Subscribing to ethical commitments (in an autonomous, self-reflective way, 
rather than simply via programmed rules) which recognize appropriate moral rights of people with 
needs, desires, etc. 
· INTROSPECTIVE CONDITION:  Being able to articulate an introspective recognition of their own 
consciousness; ability to pass a variety of self-report tests held under rigorous experimental conditions. 
· TURING CONDITION:  Responding positively, and in a robust and persistent way, to Turing-Test style 
probes for consciousness (including blind dialogues filtered through an textual or other filtering 
interface; or physical-interaction episodes in a real-world context). 
 
There is, and no doubt will continue to be, much controversy as to which items should be on this list, on their 
detailed formulation and corroboration-conditions, and on their relative priorities. Those who favour an 
organic approach to consciousness will privilege the first few criteria, whereas those who favour a 
cognitively-based view will put more emphasis on many of the later conditions.  Nevertheless, despite the 
controversial nature of some of the items, I believe that a list like this could be drawn up, for use across the 
scientific community, to establish a broad way forward to assess different candidate artificial agent designs, 
in order to assist in decisions about presence of consciousness in those different candidates, and 
consequently their ethical status.   
 
A list of this sort does not establish the realist position on questions about when CSS properties are 
genuinely present, and consequently about which kinds of possible artificial agents might qualify for 
inclusion in the ‘circle’ of moral consideration.  Nevertheless it at least shows that ‘the machine question’ 
has an internal complexity, a fine texture, with different categories pointing to different kinds of answers, 
rather than simply being a single undifferentiated mystery from an ontological and epistemological point of 
view, leaving the vagaries of social judgment as the sole tribunal.  Moreover it suggests that this particular 
issue is not really different in nature from any complex scientific question where there are many subtle and 
cross-cutting considerations to be taken into account, and where disagreements are open to resolution, at 
least in principle, in a rational way.   
 
9   SUMMING UP 
 
Singer’s notion of the expanding ethical circle, and Harris’s suggestion that ethical questions concerning the 
‘moral landscape’ can be scientifically grounded, suggest, in different ways, a very strong linkage – possibly 
a conceptual one – between consciousness and well-being (CSS properties) and ethical concern.  In 
particular, Harris’s critique of scientific neutralism suggests the possibility of a scientific grounding to core 
ethical values:  and there is no reason why such scientific, objective grounding should not also apply to the 
ethical status of artificial agents.   
 
Of course our ethical relations with such agents will be inevitably bound up with our social relations with 
them.  As we saw, the domain of the social is expanding rapidly to include a wide variety of human-AA and 
AA-AA interactions. But sociality is itself constrained in various ways by physical, biological and 
psychological factors. And consciousness and well/ill-being (what I have called CSS) lie at the heart of these 
constraints.  Ethics and sociality are indeed closely intertwined.  But we should not assume that, just because 
there are rich and varied social interactions between humans and artificial creatures of different sorts, there 
are no considerations or constraints on the appropriateness of ethical relations that humans may adopt 
towards such artificial creatures.  Our capacities for satisfaction or suffering must be crucially based upon 
deep neural and biological properties; so too for other naturally evolved sentient creatures.  Some classes of 
artificial creatures will have closely similar biological properties, making the question of CSS-attribution 
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relatively easy for those at least.  For others (ones whose designs are advanced versions of electronic 
technologies with which we are familiar today, for example; or which are based on other technologies, a 
conception of which we currently have at best the merest glimmer, if any at all) it may be much harder to 
make dependable judgments. In the end, how we attribute CSS, and consequently ethical status, will depend 
on a multiplicity of detailed questions concerning commonalities and contrasts between human neural and 
bodily systems and analogous systems in the artificial agents under consideration. The gross apparent 
behaviours and functional cognitive/affective organization of such agents will play important roles 
(Coeckelbergh, 2009, 2010b), of course, in determining how we attribute moral patiency and agency status, 
but only in a wider mix of considerations which will include many other, less easily observable, features.  
 
Over- and under-attribution of CSS-properties cause deep ethical problems in human social life. (To take just 
one obvious and widespread example, oppressed humans all over the globe continue to have their capacity 
for suffering falsely denied, in fake justification for their brutal treatment.)  Why should it be any different 
for robots?  In a society where humans and machines have extensive and rich social interactions, false 
positive or false negative mis-attributions could each engender massive injustices – either to humans whose 
interests are being short-changed by the inappropriate shifting of resources or concern to artificial agents that 
have no intrinsic ethical requirements for them; or to artificial agents whose interests are being denied 
because of a failure to correctly identify their real capacities for CSS states.  It is not clear how a social-
relational view can properly accommodate this false-positive/false-negative dimension. 
 
I have tried to put the realist position in a way that is sensitive to the social-relational perspective.  However 
many problems and gaps remain.28 A strength of the social-relational position is that it addresses, in a way 
that it is difficult for the realist position to do, the undoubted tendency for people to humanize or 
anthropomorphize autonomous agents, something that will no doubt become more and more prevalent as AI 
agents with human-like characteristics proliferate, and which happens even when it is far from clear that any 
consciousness or sentience can exist in such agents.  There will surely be strong social pressures to integrate 
such AIs into our social fabric. Supporters of singularitarian (Kurzweil, 2005) views even insist that such 
agents will come (disarmingly rapidly, perhaps) to dominate human social existence, or at least transform it 
out of all recognition – for good or for ill.  Possibly such predictions sit better with the social-relational view 
than with the realist view, so it will be a big challenge for realism to respond adequately to the changing 
shape of human-machine society, were the rapid and far-reaching technosocial upheavals predicted by many 
to come about. Nevertheless I believe I have shown that the realist framework offers the best way forward 
for the AI and AC research community to best respond to the difficulties that such future social pressures 
may present. 
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